Linguistic intelligence isn't expressed solely by an extensive and conventionally impeccable vocabulary, if that's a matter of conventional aesthetics. Nor is it expressed solely by the ease of learning new languages, which, despite its many advantages, isn't the most important (it's worth noting that an extensive vocabulary in one's native language tends to be related to this same ease). Because the most important aspects of human language, as with any other communication system developed and used by any other species, are the ability to communicate (both in the sense of transmitting information and understanding what is being transmitted when one is in the position of listener or receiver), and to maximize one's understanding of lived and achievable reality, only possible through this process of association between symbol and information. Therefore, the most intelligent person, in essential linguistic terms, is the one who best uses a communication system, in a more objective sense (a priori, independent of the ability of others to understand it), since even individuals endowed with a broader and more sophisticated vocabulary can still use language in a non-ideal way and, in fact, it seems that they are more likely to do so, not as a means for objective or effective communication and factual understanding, but to prioritize aesthetic or artistic purposes, more personal or social, including believing the opposite of what they are doing, when they are, in fact, using their verbal capacities for these same purposes mentioned, neglecting the two most important functions of language. This may help explain the possible or apparent correlation between having a more extensive vocabulary and being more likely to believe in and delve into pseudosciences, especially those linked to the humanities, perhaps as a side effect of placing too much emphasis on aesthetics rather than the essence of language. These pseudosciences are often constructed precisely based on the aesthetic illusion of a superficial and excessive refinement of the use of words, masking their intrinsic nature as a falsification of legitimate knowledge. But it's also important to emphasize that a deficiency in rational capacity isn't just a cognitive deficiency, since non-cognitive aspects, such as personality, also influence how we think and interpret the world. However, this contradiction, which seems common among those who master the use of words but not their most important application, remains interesting. It must be because they are, on average or disproportionately, more skilled in the aesthetic use of the word, and not in its more functional or direct sense, commented on here, of communication and factual (or philosophical-scientific) understanding, mediated by self-knowledge (true/possible and specific capacity for understanding).
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sexta-feira, 18 de julho de 2025
Quem realmente é o mais inteligente com as palavras??
A inteligência linguística não se expressa apenas por um vocabulário extenso e convencionalmente impecável, se se trata de uma estética de convenção. Também não se expressa apenas pela facilidade para aprender novos idiomas, se, apesar de suas muitas vantagens, ainda não é o mais importante (vale dizer que um vocabulário extenso na língua materna tende a estar relacionado com essa mesma facilidade). Porque o mais importante da linguagem humana, assim como para qualquer outro sistema de comunicação desenvolvido e usado por qualquer outra espécie, são: as capacidades de se comunicar (tanto no sentido de transmitir uma informação como de entender o que está sendo transmitido quando se encontra em uma posição de ouvinte ou receptor), e a de maximizar a compreensão que se pode ter sobre a realidade vivida e alcançável, unicamente possível por esse processo de associação entre símbolo e informação. Portanto, o mais inteligente, em termos linguístico-essenciais, é aquele que melhor usa um sistema de comunicação, em um sentido mais objetivo (a priori, independente da capacidade dos outros em compreendê-lo), pois mesmo indivíduos dotados de um vocabulário mais amplo e sofisticado ainda podem usar a linguagem de modo não-ideal e, na verdade, parece que estão mais propensos a fazê-lo, não como um meio para a comunicação objetiva ou efetiva e a compreensão factual, mas para priorizar finalidades estéticas ou artísticas, mais pessoais ou sociais, inclusive de acreditarem no oposto do que estão fazendo, quando estão, de fato, usando suas capacidades verbais com essas mesmas finalidades citadas, negligenciando as duas funções mais importantes da linguagem. Isso pode ajudar a explicar a possível ou aparente correlação entre apresentar um vocabulário mais extenso e de se estar mais propenso a acreditar e se aprofundar em pseudociências, especialmente as que se vinculam às ciências humanas, até mesmo como um efeito colateral de se dar muita ênfase na estética do que à essência da linguagem, já que essas pseudociências costumam ser construídas justamente com base na ilusão estética de um refinamento superficial e excessivo do uso da palavra, mascarando sua natureza intrínseca, de falsificação do conhecimento legítimo. Mas também é importante destacar que uma deficiência em capacidade racional não é apenas uma deficiência cognitiva, já que aspectos não-cognitivos, como a personalidade, também influenciam em como pensamos e interpretamos o mundo. No entanto, ainda é interessante esse contrassenso que parece comum entre aqueles que dominam o uso da palavra, mas não em sua aplicação mais importante. Deve ser por serem, em média ou desproporcionalmente, mais hábeis no uso estético da palavra, e não em seu sentido mais funcional ou direto, comentado aqui, de comunicação e compreensão factual (ou filosófico-científica), mediadas pelo autoconhecimento (capacidade verdadeira/possível e específica de compreensão).
quarta-feira, 16 de julho de 2025
A disconcerting habit of narcissists: doing good deeds for show
I don't know how common this habit is among the most narcissistic individuals. But it seems that there are certain types of narcissists who are more likely to do good deeds, not because they are truly altruistic, but to show others how supposedly kinder they are. And it's a disconcerting habit, considering that highly self-centered individuals are expected to only take actions that benefit themselves, also in the sense that they maximize their own physical and emotional well-being. But in the case of the narcissistic type who likes to pose as morally superior, this performance may serve precisely to stroke their gigantic ego.
Um hábito desconcertante de narcisistas: fazer boas ações para aparecer
Não sei o quão comum é esse hábito entre os indivíduos mais narcisistas. Mas parece que existem certos tipos de narcisistas que são mais propensos a fazerem boas ações, não por serem realmente altruístas, mas para mostrarem aos outros o quão supostamente mais bondosos eles são. E não deixa de ser um hábito desconcertante, se é esperado que indivíduos muito autocentrados só tomem atitudes que o favoreçam também no sentido de que maximizem seu próprio bem estar físico e emocional. Mas se tratando do tipo narcisista que gosta de posar como moralmente superior, essa performance pode servir justamente para afagar seu ego gigante.
A prime example of typically irrational female behavior
The social contagion of plastic surgery with questionable results
Why get plastic surgery that makes you ugly or strange instead of "improving" your appearance?
Ask this to many women who have already had surgery or are considering going under the knife and getting a new, weird face. But it's probably just to follow the trends of certain niches, usually more "privileged," upper-middle-class women, "celebrities" (many of them very rich...). And, of course, this is very irrational. If it seems more common for women to fall for these counterproductive trends than men, well, that started a long time ago. Ever since they began to accept that piercing their ears or wearing high heels makes them more feminine, or at least more acceptable in their exclusively female social circles. All for the vanity of the moment, for the constant and ongoing conformity of the Venusians. But what about the Martians?
Um exemplo cabal de um comportamento irracional tipicamente feminino
O contágio social de fazer cirurgias plásticas com resultados duvidosos
segunda-feira, 14 de julho de 2025
Summing up right-wingers and left-wingers
On average, there are two groups of simpletons, intellectually speaking. Individuals chronically incapable of deep reasoning, of rational thought, who become naturally dependent on ideologically biased and simplistic narratives to understand and deal with reality, differing in that "left-wing" narratives tend to be more superficially sophisticated. So, what most differentiates an average leftist from an average rightist is that the former passes themselves off as intellectual, while the latter doesn't necessarily care about it, typically lacking even the potential for pseudo-intellectualism. But the average leftist, or disproportionately speaking, passes themselves off as intellectual, often with little awareness that this is a sham...
Resumindo direitistas e esquerdistas
Em média, são dois grupos de simplórios, intelectualmente falando. De indivíduos cronicamente incapazes de aprofundamento de raciocínio, do pensamento racional, que se tornam naturalmente dependentes de narrativas ideologicamente enviesadas e simplistas para entender e lidar com a realidade, se diferenciando pelo fato de que as narrativas à "esquerda" tendem a ser mais superficialmente sofisticadas. Então, o que mais diferencia um esquerdista médio de um direitista médio é que o primeiro se passa como um intelectual enquanto que o segundo necessariamente não faz questão disso, se tipicamente já não apresenta sequer um potencial para o pseudo intelectualismo. Mas o esquerdista médio, ou desproporcionalmente falando, se passa como um intelectual, geralmente com pouca consciência de que se trata de uma farsa...
sexta-feira, 11 de julho de 2025
De novo, sobre a complexidade do humor
Que eu já comentei em outros textos...
The only rationally acceptable limit to opinion censorship: absolute dehumanization
This isn't much different from what I've discussed in other texts on the same topic. But here, I'll reinforce this thought more specifically. While I'm not in favor of further institutionalizing opinion censorship, this doesn't mean I'm in favor of no limits or controls at all, but rather that they be established based on a clearer definition of what constitutes an opinion that truly surpass all rationally acceptable limits. And, at least when it comes to opinions about groups, the element that distinguishes and highlights a completely execrable opinion, both intellectually and morally, is absolute dehumanization, as if all individuals belonging to a given group, especially if it's a vaguely defined group, were all the same in a completely negative, defamatory, and condemnatory sense...
For example: when a church pastor says that "all gays will go to hell for being gay," that's not the same as if any individual, who could also be an evangelical pastor, expresses a more critical opinion about this or that group without making such absolute and dehumanizing generalizations. Because, an objectively execrable opinion, not only simply being what it is, but can also easily extrapolate the abstract and manifest itself as an action or behavior.
O único limite racionalmente aceitável da censura de opinião: a desumanização absoluta
Não é muito diferente do que já comentei em outros textos sobre o mesmo tópico. Mas, aqui, reforço de maneira mais específica esse pensamento. De que, ainda que não seja a favor de um aprofundamento da institucionalização da censura de opinião, isso não significa que eu seja a favor de que não haja qualquer limite ou controle, mas que se faça a partir de uma definição mais nítida sobre o que seria uma opinião que realmente saia de todos os limites racionalmente aceitáveis. E, pelo menos em relação a opiniões sobre grupos, o elemento que distingue e destaca uma opinião totalmente execrável, tanto em um sentido intelectual, quanto em um sentido moral, é o de desumanização absoluta, como se todos os indivíduos que pertencem a determinado grupo, ainda mais se for um grupo vagamente definido, fossem todos iguais em um sentido totalmente negativo, ou difamatório e condenatório...
quinta-feira, 3 de julho de 2025
An example that explains more precisely the hierarchy of influences on human behavior
Why does crime tend to be lower in small towns?
The bigger the city, the greater the tendency for high crime rates. And the same pattern coincides, only in the opposite direction, for small towns. Even in more violent countries, such as Brazil.
So, what are the factors behind this phenomenon?
Many will point to the environment as the main factor. They will say that, in big cities, there are more people, and this factor alone increases the risk of human conflicts that result in violent acts. They will also say that social inequalities are greater and this leads some or many people, especially the poorest, to envy those who have more money than them, increasing the risk of engaging in criminal activities. And that these first two factors also fuel the urge for competition, especially among men, increasing the risk of them becoming involved in criminal activities or violent acts. They could also cite other, more specific environmental factors, such as greater access to psychotropic drugs, to claim that what is generally lacking in small cities and exceeds in large ones is sufficient to explain why there is this predominant trend of statistical differences in crime. And what's more, because they are not wrong, if, in fact, it is entirely feasible that these environmental factors have an influence on human behavior. However, these same people enter a state of absolute denial when they conclude that only the environment explains how we behave, because, even though there is a certain logic in not concluding in advance about biological or genetic factors, if they have not yet been fully identified and understood by science, it is a rationally pragmatic matter to deduce, confidently, that these factors are as influential or more influential and that discarding them, as these "circumstantialists" do, is, at the very least, imprudent. Although we do not yet have a complete picture of direct evidence on the genetic or biological influence on human behavior, it is already possible to perceive an accumulation of indirect evidence, through the observation of patterns, which confirm it, for example, by the perception of stability and predictability, in the medium and long term, of personality traits and intelligence. So, if it is true that densely populated urban environments present an increased risk of violent behavior, it is also true that individuals with different behavioral dispositions are impacted in different ways in the same environments or when they are exposed to the same stimuli and pressures, if not the majority of human beings in these spaces become violent or prone to committing crimes, not even in the outskirts of large cities. Therefore, it is not only the environment that influences human behavior, but also our own mental characteristics, which are more innate or intrinsic, and not just reflections of the influence of the environment on us. Again, it is a deduction that can be made, precisely because they are more stable and predictable in the medium and long term, because they are, on average, less influenced by social interventions or because they express themselves in a relatively independent way to pressures and stimuli (our behaviors are not absolutely logical, in the sense of reciprocal, to what happens around us or that interacts with us), there being, most likely, a coincidence or confluence between mental traits and environmental interaction factors, when there is a reciprocal response, and not that "factor x caused a behavioral expression to emerge, out of nowhere, in a certain individual". In conclusion, the most appropriate explanation for this social phenomenon, which is also behavioral, psychological, cognitive, genetic..., is that individuals with significantly higher levels of willingness to engage in violent, selfish or impulsive behavior feel more stimulated to practice them in densely populated urban environments than in less populated environments, also due to all the factors mentioned above, which serve as triggers or catalysts for tendencies and not as primary sources from which they originate. Because if only the environment had a preponderant role of influence, there would always be a great uniformity of behavior in response to it: a certain environment, pressure or stimulus, probably because of the variation in the disposition of mental characteristics (more intrinsic).
Final additional questions
Are these differences in criminality also a question of selective migration? Of mutation? And of statistical proportion??
1-
Do small towns attract or retain more individuals with a more docile temperament, while big cities tend to attract more impulsive, greedy and selfish types?
This is a very important question, because it makes sense that different environments/tend to attract or retain different types of human beings. Not that this factor fully explains this statistical difference in crime, but it can serve as an addendum that can partially explain this social phenomenon.
2-
Larger populations are more likely to have higher values of genetic diversity, because they are more susceptible to mutations that occur more naturally among them than in small populations, including mutations related to mental disorders, personality disorders...
3-
5% of psychopaths in a city of 15 thousand inhabitants (750) is not the same as 5% of psychopaths in a city of 2 million (100 thousand), right??
Therefore, having a large population increases the absolute proportion of individuals with mental disorders of a moral nature, such as psychopathy, and therefore increases the probability that they will engage in violent or criminal acts. This, without taking into account possible statistical differences in the incidence of psychopathy between small and large cities (the selective migration factor).
Um exemplo que explica mais precisamente a hierarquia de influências do comportamento humano
The main difference between indoctrination and education
The main difference between indoctrination and education
Is the factual nature of what is being transmitted...
Especially when lies, half-truths or distortions of facts, typically organized as dogmatic narratives, predominate or are already present from the very essence of a belief system, it is safe to classify it as very likely to serve as an ideological reference for indoctrination, and not for education.
That is why, affirming that God is a very possible logical improbability and that the class struggle is an empirical reality, are not examples of ideological indoctrination (the first, in fact, lacks any evidence, and the second is visible at any time in a typical human society), while denying them, are examples (on the "right") of indoctrination.
Any denial of a fact, especially a notorious fact that can be easily observed, or affirmation of an extraordinary phenomenon or event without any true evidence to corroborate it, are raw material for indoctrination.
Two other examples of indoctrination, and not education, but which are further "to the left" on the political-ideological spectrum are: the denial of the existence of more intrinsic differences in behavior and intelligence between individuals and human groups (observable and ratified by the perception of patterns of stability, predictability and heredity of behaviors), and the extraordinary assertion (a typical complement to the first) that the environment plays a much more important role in human behavior than our own nature or biology, as if we were merely reagents totally moldable by circumstances.
A principal diferença entre doutrinação e educação
É o caráter factual do que está sendo transmitido...